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A

CASE STUDY OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT
POLICY MAKING
W. Keith Robinson*

ABSTRACT
The Federal Circuit's legal decisions are perceived to have a significant
impact on patentpolicy because of its close relationshipwith the patent bar
and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Accordingly, litigants before the FederalCircuit may have the unique opportunity
to directly influence patent policy. In a 2003 article, ProfessorArti Rai suggested that if factual determinationsconcerning litigationwere the responsibility of the USPTO and U.S. District Courts, then the Federal Circuit
would be the ideal entity to make patent policy. Interestingly, during a recent panel at the 2013 Intellectual Property Symposium at the Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law, judges from the FederalCircuit suggested that they would like to see more policy arguments made in
appellate briefs. Policy arguments are generally not emphasized in Federal
Circuit briefs, but if a litigant does advance policy arguments before the
FederalCircuit,it is instructive to observe (1) how the policy arguments are
constructed, and (2) whether the Federal Circuit expresses a policy preference in its opinion. As an example, one need look no further than the Federal Circuit's recent en banc decision in Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc. (Akamai II) where a dissenting judge accused the majority
of playing policy maker.
This Article analyzes the Federal Circuit's recent en banc decision in
Akamai II from a policy perspective. This Article observes that the Federal
Circuit'sfractured decision was, at least in part, due to unhelpful statutory
language and tension between formalism and policy concerns. Further, this
Article argues all three opinions issued in Akamai are in some way consistent with policy concerns raised by the plaintiffs and their amici. Finally,
this Article raises several questions, including: When are policy arguments
most effective? What are the current limits of the Federal Circuit'spolicy
making? And what is the impact on patent stakeholders when policy arguments are raised more frequently before the Federal Circuit?
* Assistant Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law; J.D., 2004, Duke Law
School; B.S. Electrical Engineering, 1999, Duke University; the author formerly practiced
patent law at Foley & Lardner LLP in Washington, D.C. The author thanks Simone Rose,
Hilda Galvan and Andrew Chin for their insightful discussion and symposium
participation.
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SHOULD
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INTRODUCTION

judicial decisions in patent cases devote more attention to

policy concerns? Patent policy is shaped by a number of complex
stakeholder incentives. The government stakeholders include the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the United States
District Courts and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (the Federal Circuit). In addition to administrative and judicial
entities, actors such as patentees, patent owners, and defendants in patent
litigation have a role in influencing patent policy. Each stakeholder may
operate, in part, based on one or more policy incentives. Generally, "the
policy underlying our patent system attempts to create four economicbased incentives: (1) incentive to invent, (2) incentive to disclose, (3) incentive to commercialize, and (4) incentive to design around."' Every
1. M. Scott McBride, Patentabilityof Human Genes: Our Patent System Can Address
the Issues Without Modification, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 511, 525 (2001) (citing DONALD S.
CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAw 62-67 (1998)).
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stakeholder has ideas about the importance of these incentives, and each
is instrumental to developing patent policy.
The most interesting problems for the patent system arise when the
policy incentives of patent system stakeholders and patent law fail to
align. This tension often plays out in litigation. In addition to purely legal
arguments, the litigants can raise policy arguments that may influence a
court's final disposition of a case. Professor Arti Rai has argued that the
courts are better suited to developing patent policy than the slow machinery of the legislature. 2 Specifically, she argued that, under certain conditions, the Federal Circuit could be in the best position to formulate patent
3
policy.
In fact, some members of the Federal Circuit seem willing to entertain
more policy arguments. On March 22, 2013, the SMU Dedman School of
Law hosted a symposium on emerging intellectual property issues called
"The Federal Circuit and Patent Law." 4 During the morning session, Federal Circuit Judges Dyk, Prost and Clevenger spoke about their experience as judges on the Federal Circuit and suggested that more briefs
should be filed at the Federal Circuit containing policy arguments.5 This
suggestion intimated that illuminating important policy concerns would
assist the Federal Circuit in making difficult decisions.
The judges' statements were provocative for a number of reasons. For
example, a central tenet of the Federal Circuit has been to not engage in
policy making with respect to patent claims. 6 Specifically, the Federal Circuit has said on numerous occasions that it will not redraft claims to ensure the validity of a patent or to establish that a patent has been
infringed.7 Further, there is a perception that the Federal Circuit generally ignores policy considerations in its jurisprudence. 8 In fact, in several
major areas of patent law, the Federal Circuit's approach to decision
making has been a formalist one. 9
Due to the Federal Circuit's record regarding policy considerations,
several practitioners at the symposium suggested that it would disservice
clients to commandeer precious space in briefs for policy arguments not
likely to influence the court.
In response, one attendee suggested that amicus briefs could fill this
void instead. That is, rather than rehashing the same arguments included
2. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-InstitutionalApproach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1131 (2003).
3. Id. at 1102-03.
4. See Raymond C. Clevenger, Timothy B. Dyk, Sharon Prost & Mike McKool, Panel
Discussion at SMU Symposium on Emerging IP Issues (Mar. 22, 2013) (video recording
available in the SMU Law School Library).
5. Id.
6. 3-8 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.03.
7. Id. ("Generally, courts deny the power to re-write claims, whether to preserve
validity or to establish infringement. Under limited circumstances, an error in a patent can
be corrected by a certificate from the Patent and Trademark Office.").
8. See Rai, supra note 2 at 1101.
9. Id. at 1103-04 ("information technology, the intersection of patent and antitrust,
and, most recently, the construction of the experimental use defense").
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in the parties' briefs, amici could focus on the policy. But how much do
amicus briefs focus on policy arguments? And how effective are those
policy arguments in influencing the judges?
To answer these policy related questions, it may be instructive to look
at the recent en banc decision, Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc. (Akamai II), in which a dissenting Judge Linn accused the
majority of policy making.10 Decided in August of 2012, Akamai II concerned the contentious issue of joint infringement." Joint infringement is
a doctrine that explains how to allocate liability where more than one
entity performs the steps of a method claim such that the entities' performance in the aggregate infringes the claimed method. 12 The Federal
Circuit has continuously modified the doctrine in cases dating back to
2007.13 Akamai II is the culmination of four major joint infringement
cases heard before the Federal Circuit.' 4 As expected, a number of amici
filed briefs in the case-many of which highlighted the unique policy issues at stake.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the evolution of the joint infringement doctrine that led to the Federal Circuit's decision to rehear
the most recent case en banc.
Part III of this Article discusses the Federal Circuit's Akamai II decision. There, an en banc Federal Circuit narrowly held that to successfully
enforce a patent when more than one party performs all of the steps of a
claimed method, the patentee must show that one of the alleged infringers induced the infringement of the other party.' 5
The opinion is interesting for several reasons. First, it failed to answer
many of the questions the Federal Circuit asked the parties to brief. For
example, the majority passed on the opportunity to clarify the law of joint
infringement as applied to liability for direct infringement under 35
U.S.C. § 271(a).1 6 Instead, the Federal Circuit simply acknowledged that
doctrinal problems arise "when the acts necessary to give rise to liability
for direct infringement are shared between two or more actors."' 7 As a
result, a slim majority of the court overruled its previous decisions in
10. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai If), 692 F.3d 1301, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) ("In its opinion today, this court assumes the mantle of policy maker.").
11. Id. at 1305-06.
12. See generally id. at 1305-04.
13. See generallyW. Keith Robinson, No "Direction"Home: An Alternative Approach
to Joint Infringement, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 59 (2012); W. Keith Robinson, Ramifications of
Joint Infringement Theory on Emerging Technology Patents, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J.
335 (2010).
14. See generally McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai 1), 629 F.3d 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2010) rev'd, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; Muniauction Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532
F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008); BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
15. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1305.
16. See id. at 1305-06.
17. Id. at 1305.
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BMC Resources and Muniauction, establishing a new test under induced
infringement for when more than one party performs steps in a method
claim. 18
Underlying this change in the Federal Circuit's perspective is an interesting policy debate related to the incentives of the patent system. As a
result, the court issued a majority opinion and two dissents. The majority
decision in Akamai II is a more nuanced approach than the bright-line
rule advocated for by the defendants. In one dissent, Judge Linn, joined
by three other judges, argued for the preservation of the direction or control test and asserted that the test provides for a finding of liability when
there is a joint enterprise.1 9 In the second dissent, Judge Newman, writing
for herself, argued that there should be liability for infringement whenever one or more parties perform the steps of a claimed method. 20 While
all three factions of the Federal Circuit argued for different legal standards, the court also struggled to define its role in shaping patent policy.
Part III concludes that the Federal Circuit's fractured decision was, at
least in part, due to unhelpful statutory language and tension between
formalism and policy concerns.
Parts IV and V of this Article use the litigants and amici's appellate
briefs to analyze the arguments presented in Akamai II from a policy
perspective. Parts IV and V conclude that all three opinions issued in
Akamai II are in some way consistent with policy concerns raised by the
plaintiffs and their amici. While there is no way to ascertain whether any
of the policy arguments had a direct effect on the outcome of the case,
the Federal Circuit's fractured decision was most likely a result of poor
alignment between the current infringement statute and the policy concerns raised by personalized medicine and Internet-age inventions.
Thus, the Federal Circuit's opinion presents uncertainty and several
questions without definitive answers. Is the opinion in Akamai II a signal
to the Supreme Court or to Congress for help? How should the court rule
when the applicable statute is clear and yet unhelpful? How can policyfocused stakeholders, such as frequently sued litigants, be more effective
at influencing patent policy at the appellate level? Finally, can developing
a further understanding of this instance of judicial policy making help
identify other legal issues in cases before the Federal Circuit where policy
arguments may play a larger role in the outcome?
II.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S JOINT
INFRINGEMENT PROBLEM

In BMC Resources, the Federal Circuit established a standard for joint
infringement liability when multiple parties perform one or more but not
18. Id.
19. See generally id. at 1337-51.
20. Id. at 1319-37.
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all the steps of a method claim. 21 The Federal Circuit's Muniauction decision expanded on BMC Resources by setting forth specific examples of
when the BMC Resources test could be satisfied. 2 2 The decisions in
Akamai I and McKesson followed several years later, both resulting in
the Federal Circuit deciding to rehear both cases en banc. 23 Both Akamai
I and McKesson will be discussed briefly below. This Part begins with an
overview of the BMC Resources and Muniauction cases.

A.

EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY

Both patents at issue in BMC Resources and Muniauction involved

methods carried out over an electronic network. The asserted patent in
Muniauction purported to cover a method for auctioning financial instruments over an electronic network using a web browser. 24 The claims at
issue in Muniauction required the participation of more than one entity. 25
Similarly, in BMC Resources, the plaintiff, BMC Resources, Inc. (BMC),
alleged that the defendant, Paymentech L.P. (Paymentech), infringed two
patents claiming methods for processing debit transactions over a network with a touch-tone telephone. 26 One of the asserted claims required
four different parties to perform different acts within the single claim. 2 7
To illustrate, claim 2 of the asserted U.S. Patent No. 5,715,298 asserted in
BMC Resources is reproduced below. Since claim 2 depends on claim 1,
claim 1 is also included. Claims 1 and 2 read:
1. A method of paying bills using a telephone connectable to at least
one remote payment card network via a payee's agent's system,
wherein a caller places a call using said telephone to initiate a spontaneous payment transaction that does not require pre-registration,
to a payee, the method comprising the steps of: prompting the caller
to enter an account number using the telephone, the account number
identifying an account of a payor with the payee in connection with
the payment transaction; responsive to entry of an account number,
determining whether the entered account number is valid; prompting
the caller to enter a payment number using the telephone, the payment number being selected at the discretion of the caller from any
one of a number of credit or debit forms of payment; responsive to
entry of the payment number, determining whether the entered payment number is valid; prompting the caller to enter a payment
amount for the payment transaction using the telephone; responsive
to a determination that a payment amount has been entered and fur21. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
22. Muniauction Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
23. See Akamai 1, 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev'd, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301;
McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
24. Id.
25. See Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1321-22.
26. See BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1375 (stating that BMC's patents required the combined actions of several participants, including the payee's agent, a remote payment network, and the financial institution that issued the card).
27. Id. at 1382.
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ther responsive to a determination that the entered account number
and payment number are valid, and during the call: accessing a remote payment network associated with the entered payment number, the accessed remote payment network determining, during the
call, whether sufficient available credit or funds exist in an account
associated with the entered payment number to complete the payment transaction; responsive to a determination that sufficient available credit or funds exist in the associated account, charging the
entered payment amount against the account associated with the entered payment number, adding the entered payment amount to an
account associated with the entered account number, informing the
caller that the payment transaction has been authorized, and storing
the account number, payment number and payment amount in a
transaction log file of the system during the call; and responsive to a
determination that sufficient available credit or funds do not exist in
the associated account, informing the caller during the call that the
current payment transaction has been declined and terminating the
current payment transaction.
2. The method of claim 1 wherein said payment number is a debit
card number. 28
In both BMC Resources and Muniauction, the defendants' arguments
focused on the fact that it did not perform all the steps of the asserted
claims. Specifically, Paymentech argued that it did not infringe BMC's
claims because it did not perform all the claimed steps by itself or in coordination with other financial institutions or customers. 29 In Muniauction,
both parties agreed that no single entity performed all the claimed
method steps.3 0 Accordingly, in both cases, the central question arose:
Under what circumstances could an accused infringer be liable for infringement when they do not perform all the claimed method steps?
In BMC Resources, the Federal Circuit explained that to succeed in a
claim for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), a plaintiff must
show that a single entity performed each step of the asserted claim. 31 Further, even liability under an indirect infringement theory required an initial finding of direct infringement. 32 A defendant, however, could not
escape liability by having another party perform a step on its behalf.3 3
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit established a control or direction standard that imposed liability on a controlling party for the acts of another
where the controlling party controlled or directed the conduct of the acting party. 34 The court further explained that arms-length cooperation
would not satisfy the direction or control standard.3 5 But the standard
28. U.S. Patent No. 5,715,298 (filed Jan. 22, 1997).
29. BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1377.
30. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1328.
31. BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1380 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (2007)).
32. Id. at 1379.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing Engle v. Dinehart, 213 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. 2000)).
35. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329 (citing BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1371).
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might be satisfied in a situation where the accused infringer is held vicariously liable for the acts of another party.36
The policy issues debated in Akamai II began to take shape in BMC
Resources and Muniauction. The Federal Circuit reiterated that it would
not restructure claims to support a finding of infringement. 37 Both defendants were found not to infringe the claims-a trend of non-infringement findings that continued throughout the cases heard by the Federal
Circuit and the majority of district court cases.38 In addition, the Federal
Circuit acknowledged that its interpretation of the infringement statutes
created a loophole in the law that allowed parties to escape liability by
entering into arms-length agreements. 39 The court, however, warned that
expanding the reach of the statute would subvert the statutory scheme
underlying indirect infringement. 40 Finally, it is important to note that the
patents at issue in both cases were related to Internet-Age technologiestechnology that did not exist in 1952 when the patent infringement laws
were codified by statute.
B.

MODIFICATION OF THE JOINT INFRINGEMENT

DOCTRINE

The Federal Circuit modified its position on joint infringement liability
in Akamai I and McKesson. Similar to BMC Resources and Muniauction,
the technologies at issue in Akamai I and McKesson were Internet-Age
technologies. 4 1 In Akamai I, Akamai Technologies, Inc. and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (collectively, Akamai) sued Limelight
Networks, Inc. (Limelight) for infringing patents directed to a content
delivery network service. 42 Generally, a content delivery service is a system of computers that allows an Internet content provider to outsource
the storage and delivery of website content. 43 In McKesson, the technology at issue related to a method for sharing medical information over the
Internet between a patient and a healthcare provider.44 McKesson accused Epic Systems Corporation (Epic) of inducing infringement of its
patents by licensing Epic's "MyChart" software to healthcare providers
who then provided the software to patients.4 5
A central fact common to Akamai I and McKesson was that neither
defendant performed all the steps of the claimed method. In fact, in both
36. Id. at 1330 (citing BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1379).
37. BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1381 (citing Sage Prods. Inc. v. Devon Indus. Inc., 126 F.3d
1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
38. See id.; see also Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330.
39. BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1381.
40. Id.
41. See generallyMcKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281,
1282 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev'd, Akamai II,
692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
42. Akamai I, 629 F.3d at 1315.
43. Id. at 1315-16.
44. McKesson Info. Solutions LLC v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 1:06-CV-2965-JTC, 2009
WL 2915778, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 2009), affd sub nom. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic
Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
45. McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
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cases, all parties agreed that the accused products did not perform all the
steps of the asserted claims. 46 Instead, using a theory of joint infringement, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants directed or controlled customers to perform the remaining steps of the accused method claims. 47 In
Akamai I, the Federal Circuit narrowed the scope of its precedent in
BMC Resources and Muniauction by stating that joint infringement could
only occur (1) "when there is an agency relationship between the parties
who perform the method steps," or (2) "when one party is contractually
obligated to the other to perform the steps." 48 Applying this agency or
contractual obligation test in both Akamai I and McKesson, the Federal
Circuit found that neither provider-customer relationships rose to the
level of an agency or contractual obligation. 49 Accordingly, neither defendant was found to have infringed the asserted claims.50
Unfortunately, these two rulings did not settle many of the concerns
first raised in BMC Resources and Muniauction, such as whether a claim
could be directly infringed by separate entities.5 ' Judge Newman asserted
that the decision in McKesson was an attack on all interactive methods
and Internet-Age technologies. 52 Further, Judge Newman warned that
the Federal Circuit's holdings harmed the incentive to patent for many
technology companies.5 3 Subsequently, the Federal Circuit decided to rehear both cases en banc in Akamai II. The central question before the
Federal Circuit was whether there can be liability for infringement when
different entities each perform separate steps of a method claim? 54
III.

ASSUMING THE MANTLE AS POLICY MAKER

The Federal Circuit's decision in Akamai H is perplexing. First, the per
curiam opinion failed to resolve many of the issues the parties were asked
to brief.55 Most notably, the opinion did not clarify the rule for finding
liability in multiple parties for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a). 56 Instead, the court partially overruled BMC Resources and
Muniauction, and crafted a new inducement-only test.57
46. See Akamai 1, 629 F.3d at 1317; McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
47. See Akamai 1, 629 F.3d at 1317; McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
48. Akamai 1, 629 F.3d at 1320.
49. See id. at 1321; McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284 (opining that MyChart
users only acted for their own benefit and were not under the MyChart providers' control).
50. Akamai 1, 629 F.3d at 1322; McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284.
51. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 419 F. App'x 989, 989 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
52. McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291 (Newman, J., dissenting) (claiming that
the majority's decision removed all interactive methods from patent eligibility).
53. Id. ("A patent that cannot be enforced on any theory of infringement, is not a
statutory patent right.").
54. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (explaining the question as "identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another"
(quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
55. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
56. Id. at 1305-06.
57. Id. at 1306.
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Possibly due to the complex legal and policy questions, the Federal Circuit was split into three camps. The majority opinion opined that there
could be third-party liability under an inducement theory.58 The first dissent, authored by Judge Newman, asserted that there should be liability
for infringement whenever one or more parties perform the steps of a
claimed method.59 The second dissent, authored by Judge Linn, argued
that the control or direction test was sound and could be interpreted to
include a finding of liability where there is a joint enterprise.60 The subParts below will briefly summarize the positions taken by the judges in
Akamai II, highlighting where policy concerns may have had a significant
impact.
A.
1.

THE CREATION OF A PARTIAL INDUCEMENT TEST

The Majority's Reinterpretation of § 271(b)

The majority acknowledged that with respect to method patents parties
can, and often do, share the performance of method steps between
them. 61 Accordingly, instead of addressing the issue of whether direct infringement can be found when there is no single party that performs all
the claimed steps, the majority opinion sought to answer two questions. 62
First, can a party be held liable for induced infringement if the defendant
has performed some claimed steps and induced other parties to commit
the remaining steps? 63 Second, can a party be held liable for induced infringement if the defendant has induced other parties to collectively perform all the steps of a claimed method? 64
In answering these questions, the majority overruled parts of its holdings in BMC Resources and Muniauction.65 In BMC Resources and

Muniauction, the Federal Circuit held that a defendant was liable for induced infringement under § 271(b) only if the defendant directed or controlled another party to perform the claimed steps. 66 BMC Resources
required that infringement be committed by a single entity under the direction or control of another entity.67 The holdings in BMC Resources
and Muniauction resulted in immunizing an inducer of infringement when
there is no direct infringement. 68 In response, the holding in Akamai II
did away with the "single entity" requirement under § 271(b). 69
The majority's approach was to reinterpret the inducement statute in
order to cover some multi-party activities. Generally, a party is liable for
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

1305-19.
1336 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1350 (Linn, J., dissenting).
1306 (majority opinion).
1305.
1306.
1314.
1315.
1308-09.
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inducement under § 271(b) if he advises or encourages another to infringe, and the inducement leads to actual infringement. 70 Induced infringement requires that the inducer intend to induce acts that infringe.71
However, for liability to attach, the induced party does not have to be
under the direction or control of the inducer. 72 Instead of following BMC
Resources, which required that there be direct infringement committed
by a single actor for inducement liability, the majority held that a party
who induces others to collectively perform claimed method steps or performs some steps and induces others to perform the remaining steps is

liable under § 271(b).73

2. Support for the Majority's Position
To support its argument that induced infringement does not require
direct infringement committed by a single actor, the majority relied heavily on the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act. Specifically, the majority relied on a hypothetical given by Judge Giles Rich while
commenting on the future of 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Judge Rich opined that
the Supreme Court cases at that time made it impossible to enforce patents where there is obvious infringement, but instead of a direct infringer,
there are multiple contributory infringers. 74 Thus, the majority concluded
75
that indirect infringement is a cause of action that should be recognized.
Further, the majority asserted that support for the idea that an actor is
76
liable for inducing intermediaries can be found by analogy in criminal
and tort law.77 The majority explained that § 271(b) codified the common
law standard for indirect infringement, which applied to parties that directed, encouraged or aided in patent infringement.78 The majority observed that a key difference between vicarious liability and liability for
inducement in tort law is that inducement requires knowledge of the consequences of the induced conduct. 7 9 Further, because tort law assigns liability even when the induced party is an innocent actor, the court
concluded that liability for patent infringement could be found in the absence of direct infringement.80
The majority's opinion also rebutted several arguments made by the
litigants and dissenting judges. In a response to Judge Linn's dissent, the
majority stated that an act of infringement under § 271(b) need not qual70. Id. at 1307.
71. Id. at 1308.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1305-06.
74. Id. at 1310. Given his hypothetical of a claim directed to the operation of radio
communication, requiring both reception and transmission.
75. Id. at 1311.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1312.
78. Id. at 1311.
79. Id. at 1312-13.
80. Id. at 1313.
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ify as an act of infringement under § 271(a).8 1 In support of this assertion,
the majority cited several other provisions of § 271 that specifically define
different conduct as infringement.8 2 None of the provisions cited first require a finding of infringement under § 271(a). The majority distinguished Aro by pointing out that Aro is related to a product claim where
there is always a direct infringer.8 3 In contrast, there may not always be a
direct infringer for method claims. Further, the majority noted that none
of the cases before BMC Resources held that all the steps of a method
claim must be performed by a single entity to find indirect infringement. 84
For example, in Solva Waterproof Glue Co., the defendant was a contributory infringer by performing one step of a two-step process.8 5
Based on its new inducement test, the majority summarized what must
be shown to find liability in each of the specific cases on appeal. First, in
McKesson, Epic would be liable if "(1) it knew of McKesson's patent, (2)
it induced the performance of the steps of the method claimed in the
patent, and (3) those steps were performed." 86 In Akamai I, Limelight
would be liable if it knew of Akamai's patent, performed some of the
steps of the claimed method, induced the performance of the remaining
step or steps, and those remaining steps were performed.8 7
In sum, the majority held that there can be liability for induced infringement where all the steps are not performed by a single entity.88
Because inducement does not require the induced party to be an agent of
the inducer or under the direction or control of the inducer, the effect of
the majority's opinion is to eliminate the "control or direction" test established and elaborated upon in BMC Resources and Muniauction. Relying
on the House Report on the 1952 Patent Act, the majority reasoned that
inducement applies to joint infringement cases because one who aids or
abets infringement is "likewise an infringer." 89 In support of its inducement only rule, the majority also explained that an inducer has the same
impact on the patentee whether he induces one party or multiple parties
to infringe. 90
B. JUDGE NEWMAN'S DISSENT
Judge Newman has consistently opined that there should be liability for
infringement of a claimed method no matter how it is performed,

whether it be by a single entity or multiple independent parties. 91 In the
81. Id. at 1314.
82. Id. at 1314.
83. Id. at 1316.
84. Id. at 1317.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1318.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1306.
89. Id. at 1309.
90. Id. at 1309-10.
91. Id. at 1323 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Infringement is not a question of how many
people it takes to perform a patented method.").
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absence of recognizing such liability, Judge Newman has stated that the
patent incentive for interactive procedures is severely weakened. 92 Thus,
a patent that cannot be infringed does not provide the patentee with a
patent at all. 9 3 These policy principles are clearly on display in her dissent
in Akamai II.
In her dissent, Judge Newman claimed that "[t]he majority's theory is a
spontaneous judicial creation." 94 Specifically, Judge Newman interpreted
the majority's opinion as assigning liability solely to the party inducing
infringement while exonerating the party that was induced (and directly
infringed the claimed steps) from liability. 95 Accordingly, Judge Newman
asserted that the majority created new enforcement and compensation
problems as well as "new opportunities for gamesmanship and abuse and
inequity." 96
Judge Newman argued that the majority's test created a new standard
for patent infringement-one where inducement, without direct infringement is sufficient for patent liability. 97 Consistent with previous holdings
in BMC Resources and Muniauction, Newman alternatively suggested
that for there to be liability for inducement, there must be a direct infringement. 98 In support of this position, she cited several cases. 99 In addition, Judge Newman relied on a statement made by Judge Rich in
congressional hearings in 1949 and 1951 stating that for there to be contributory infringement there must be direct infringement. oo Based on
Judge Rich's testimony, when two or more parties act together to infringe
a patent they are not direct infringers, but instead are contributory
infringers.101
The majority's interpretation, Judge Newman argued, results in the inability of a patentee to sue direct infringers of a patent when infringement occurs by the aggregate acts of multiple parties. 102 The patentee's
only recourse is against a party that has induced the infringing acts.103 In
Judge Newman's view, the main issue was "whether a method patent is
92. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1285-86
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that by upholding the notion that "neither collaboration nor joint
action nor facilitation nor authorization nor invitation can overcome the immutable barrier
to infringement when all of the participating entities are not under the 'control or direction' of a mastermind infringer," the court eliminates the patent incentive for interactive
procedures and "disserves commerce, fairness, and the innovation incentive.").
93. See id. at 1291 ("A patent that cannot be enforced on any theory of infringement,
is not a statutory patent right.").
94. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1321 (Newman, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1320.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1329.
98. Id. at 1328.
99. Id. at 1328-29 (discussing Met-Coil Systems Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803
F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
100. Id. at 1329.
101. Id. at 1330.
102. Id.
103. Id.

SMU LAW REVIEW

592

[Vol. 66

infringed when more than one entity performs the claimed steps of the
method." 104 And based on the existing law of infringement, her answer
would be yes. 0 5
Accordingly, instead of the inducement-only rule or the single-entity
rule, Judge Newman suggested that the current law under § 271 already
crafts an appropriate remedy.10 6 Specifically, direct infringement can be
accomplished by more than one entity.'0 7 In support of her position,
Judge Newman observed that § 271(a) uses the word "whoever," which
can stand for a singular entity or multiple entities. 0 8 Second, prior to
BMC Resources and Muniauction, Judge Newman argued that a claim
was directly infringed when all the steps of the claimed method were performed regardless of how many entities performed the individual steps.109
Third, Judge Newman referenced the Federal Circuit approval of a jury
instruction in On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc., in
which it was not necessary for a jury to find a solo actor liable for infringement because multiple parties can be found jointly liable. 110 Judge
Newman's opinion then quoted The Law of Useful Inventions, which
stated that "any person who participates in any wrongful appropriation of
the invention becomes thereby a violator of the rights protected by the
patent.""'
According to Judge Newman, the majority's test also fell short because
it failed to explain how liability is assessed.11 2 She asserted that when a
patent is infringed by more than one entity a remedy should be allocated
based on tort principles of apportionment.' 13 Factors that are considered
under this apportionment calculus include: the relative contribution to
the injury; the economic benefit received by the infringer; and the knowledge or culpability of the contributory infringer.11 4 In practical terms,
Judge Newman suggested that the allocation of a remedy to patentees for
infringement of their method by multiple entities should be determined
on a case-by-case basis.1' 5
Finally, Judge Newman addressed the policy concern that innocent
third parties may be held liable for infringement by (1) stating that such a
result is not required by the law and (2) pointing out that most defendants in patent infringement suits are commercial participants with significant financial resources.11 6 This is not to say that the innocent infringer
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1327.
at 1321.
at 1322.
at
at
at
at

1325.
1324.
1330.
1331.

at 1332.
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cannot be sued; rather, the portion of an innocent party's damages would
be insignificant compared to the commercial actor.
C.

JUDGE LINN's DISSENT

This Part summarizes Judge Linn's dissent in Akamai II in which three
other judges joined. The dissent began forcefully by accusing the majority
of judicial policy making.'" Next, Judge Linn provided his own interpretation of the patent infringement statutes at issue.' 18 The dissent then
refuted the majority's interpretation of § 271 and admonished the majority for not resolving the issue of how joint infringement applies to liability
for direct infringement.' 19 In its place, Judge Linn argued for an expanded interpretation of the "direction or control" test.120
1. Statutory Interpretation
Patent infringement is a statutorily defined tort under 35 U.S.C.

§ 271.121 Sections 271 (a)-(c) are the most relevant to joint infringement,
and the dissent briefly discussed the contours of these sections. Section
271(a) defines direct infringement. In his dissent, Judge Linn initially defined direct infringement as a strict liability offense requiring that a single
actor meets the "all elements rule"-that is, performs each and every step
of a method claim.122 In Judge Linn's view, strict liability "protects" an
actor who does not perform all the steps of a claim from infringement
liability.123 In response to the argument that the word "whoever" undermines the single entity rule, he argued that the use of the word "whoever" implies that more than one person can be independently liable for
patent infringement.12 4 In addition, because §§ 271(b) and 271(c) cover
specific examples of when a party is liable for acts other than direct infringement, Judge Linn concluded that § 271(a) is limited to acts of infringement performed by a single entity.125 Further, the dissent argued
that the term infringement has the same meaning in § 271(a) that it does
in §§ 271(b) and 271(c).1 26
Subsections (b) and (c) address multi-party conduct.127 While § 271(b)
codifies the doctrine of inducement, § 271(c) codifies the doctrine of contributory infringement. 2 8 Specifically, § 271(b) assigns liability to one
who induced "infringement" as defined in § 271(a).129 Similarly, § 271(c)
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1338-39.
Id. 1338.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1338.
Id. at 1347.
Id.
Id. at 1348.
Id.
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1338.
Id.
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assigns liability to one who sells a component part that is especially
adapted for use in infringement. 13 0 Accordingly, Linn deduced that if the
entire invention is not practiced as required under § 271(a), then there
can be no infringement under subsections (b) or (c). 131 In support of this
statement, Judge Linn's dissent noted that in Aro Manufacturing Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., the Supreme Court stated that "if
there is no direct infringement of a patent there can be no contributory
infringement."13 2 That is, "[u]nless someone is liable as a direct infringer,
no one can be liable for indirect infringement." 133
2. Judge Linn's Proposal
As an alternative to the majority's position, Judge Linn proposed to
simply apply the "control or direction" test as articulated in BMC Resources. 134 He explained that despite the single-entity rule, liability under
§ 271(a) can be found where there is vicarious liability.135 That is, where
one party controls or directs each step of a patented process, the directing
party is liable for infringement under § 271(a).
To address broader policy concerns, Judge Linn expanded the contours
of BMC Resources and Muniauction to encompass what he refers to as
"joint enterprises."1 3 6 According to the dissent, joint enterprises are individual participants who act together to infringe a patent.137 The acts of
one member are imputed to the others, thus creating a separate infringing
consciousness referred to as a joint enterprise.13 8 Thus, if a party participates in a joint enterprise that infringes a claim, they are liable as direct
infringers under § 271(a).139
But what must happen for a joint enterprise to be created? Judge Linn
explained that for a joint enterprise to exist: (1) an express or implied
agreement must exist between the members of the group; (2) the group
carries out a common purpose; (3) the group's members have a pecuniary
interest in that purpose, and (4) each member presumably has an equal
right to a voice in the direction of the joint enterprise.140 Based on these
factors, Judge Linn concluded that the decision in a previous joint infringement case, Golden Hour, should be overruled.141 Further, Judge
Linn argued for a finding of non-infringement in both Akamai and McKesson because there was no evidence of direction or control of an
130. Id. at 1339.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1340 (Linn, J., dissenting) (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961)).
133. Id. at 1341.
134. Id. at 1350.
135. Id. at 1348.
136. Id. at 1349.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1350.
140. Id. at 1349.
141. Id.
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outside entity or a joint enterprise. 142
3. Judge Linn's Rejection of the Majority's PartialInducement Test
Judge Linn's dissent also addressed several of the supporting arguments made by the majority. He discounted Judge Rich's testimony as a
basis for the majority's interpretation and formulation of its new rule. For
example, Judge Linn stated that the testimony of Judge Rich relied on by
the majority was inconclusive and contradictory.1 43 Moreover, Judge Linn
argued that Judge Rich's testimony was not entitled to any weight because he was not a member of Congress.144
The dissent also took issue with the analogies to other areas of the law
drawn by the majority opinion. In response to the majority's analogy to
criminal law, Judge Linn explained that the Supreme Court requires
proof of the underlying statutory violation to convict an accessory who
induces a criminal act.14 5 That is, criminal liability requires an actual offense similarly to how § 271(b) requires direct infringement.146 Further,
the dissent argued that the sources cited by the majority stand for the
proposition that a party that is encouraged or induced to commit a tort is
also liable.147 In addition, inducement liability only exists when there is
an underlying breach of duty.148 In sum, with respect to patent infringement, the dissent concluded that there can be no inducement without direct infringement.1 49
Judge Linn's dissent also addressed some of the policy concerns raised
by the other opinions. First, he reiterated that most of these problems can
be resolved with proper claim drafting and warned that the court should
not change the law to accommodate poorly drafted claims.' 5 0 In addition,
Judge Linn argued that Judge Newman's formulation of liability leads to
undesirable results when applied to system and apparatus claims.' 5 ' Finally, Judge Linn argued that it is not the Federal Circuit's role to close
the loophole the court itself acknowledges exists.152 Instead, where Congress sought to expand or add to the definition of infringement, Judge
Linn argued that Congress did so by creating subsections (e), (f) and (g)
to § 271.153 In other words, where loopholes existed, Congress enacted
legislation to close them.154 Finally, Judge Linn's dissent argued that Congress, given the recent enactment of the AIA, had an opportunity to
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 1350-51.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1345-46.
Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1349-1350.
Id. at 1330.
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change the law, but since it did not, it must have been satisfied with the
decisions in BMC and Muniauction.5 5
IV. THE POLICY PERSPECTIVES OF THE APPEAL BRIEFS
A.

PATENTEE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The plaintiffs' briefs addressed policy considerations from a patentee
perspective. However, very little policy is discussed in McKesson's opening or reply brief.15 6 Instead, the fifty-two pages of text were dedicated to
the legal arguments at issue. 157 In contrast, Akamai's principal brief addressed several policy issues.s5 8 Akamai also dedicated a few paragraphs
in its reply brief to policy arguments.159 These arguments addressed issues such as claim drafting, foreign law, innocent infringer liability, and
the desirability of a bright-line legal rule. 160 Overall, the policy arguments
illustrate the disadvantages of a rigid test for joint infringement liability
while acknowledging the need to protect innocent consumers from liability. All three opinions issued in Akamai II are consistent with these policy
concerns.
1. Bright-Line Rules Should Be Discouraged
Akamai's brief discouraged the Federal Circuit from adopting a brightline rule just because it would be easy to apply.161 The brief referenced
recent Supreme Court decisions that discourage the adoption of rigid
rules instead of more flexible guidelines.162 Accordingly, Akamai argued
that a flexible joint infringement test comports with the Supreme Court's
preference for flexible standards in lieu of bright-line rules.163
Akamai argued that the test formulated in Akamai I (finding joint infringement if there is a master-servant or contractual relationship) cre155. Id.
156. See Opening En Banc Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant McKesson Technologies, Inc.,
McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010-1291 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 20, 2011), 2011 WL
2822667.
157. Id. at 1.
158. Principal Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Akamai Technologies, Inc. on Rehearing En
Banc at 30-37, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011 WL 2822716.
159. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Akamai Technologies, Inc. on Rehearing En
Banc at 20-26, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011 WL 4438648.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 25.
162. Id.
163. Id. In KSR InternationalCo. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007), for example,
the Supreme Court rejected a rigid approach of using solely a "TSM test" for determining
obviousness, noting that it may be a test for determining obviousness, but it was not the
only test. See also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225-26 (2010) (rejecting bright-line
machine or transformation test for determining patentable subject matter); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006) (rejecting the Federal Circuit's brightline grant of permanent injunctions when validity and infringement have been found);
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65-67 (1998) (rejecting a bright-line rule that an
invention cannot be "on sale" unless and until it is reduced to practice).
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ated a loophole that devalues multi-participant claims.164 To illustrate,
Akamai noted that a recent legal strategy among in-house counsel was to
structure contracts so that a "mastermind" is not identified.165 Further,
Akamai raised the Golden Hour case as an example of two companies
who avoided infringement liability even though they were strategic partners and collaborated to sell the allegedly infringing product.166 Akamai
concluded, drawing from Judge Newman's dissent in McKesson, that an
unenforceable patent is essentially a grant of illusory rights.167 Thus, it is
no surprise that Judge Newman's proposal in Akamai II is the least likely
to resemble a bright-line rule.
2. Careful Claim Drafting Is Not a Cure-all
In response to the argument that most joint infringement issues could
be addressed by proper claim drafting, Akamai asserted that using
"wordsmithing" to draft claims directed to a single entity may be inconsistent with a patentee's responsibility to clearly claim an invention.168
Further, Akamai pointed to the claims at issue in the Golden Hour case
as an example of claims directed to a single entity that still gave rise to
joint infringement concerns.1 69 That is, the defendants still managed to
divide the steps among them.170 Finally, Akamai argued that accurate
claiming of multi-participant inventions requires multi-participant
claims.171 In support of this assertion, Akamai's reply brief gave examples
of multi-participant claims from the biotechnology area including claims
at issue in Prometheus, Metabolite, and Myriad.172 Thus, it is clear that
164. Principal Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Akamai, supra note 158 at 33.
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367,
1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
167. Principal Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Akamai, supra note 158 at 34.
168. Id. at 35-36.
169. Id. at 36.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Amici Pharma, Bio, and Myriad provide other examples of multi-participant claims. Myriad, for example, notes that the Court's current rule will be
"devastating in personalized medicines" and points to two cases as evidence,
Prometheus Laboratories,Inc. v. Mayo CollaborativeServices, and Metabolite
Laboratories,Inc. v. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings, ("LabCorp").
Both Prometheus and LabCorp involve claims with steps routinely performed by two different parties, a doctor and a laboratory, where it is the
correlation between these steps that constitutes the invention[.] Further, as
noted by Myriad, "the USPTO currently interprets 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Bilski v. Kappos to require the explicit recitation of a transformative step (e.g.,
the 'determining' step and/or the 'administering' step). In other words, the
claims in Prometheus and LabCorp could not have been drafted better and
still survived examination."
Similarly, in the biotechnology field, the efficacy of certain drug treatments
has been linked to biomarkers. This allows, for example, patients taking oncology drugs to save precious time by undergoing treatments that will be
more effective for them. But, because these drugs were previously used to
treat the general population, the addition of an assay step-necessarily performed by a different party from that administering the drug-is needed to
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Akamai made a significant effort to illuminate broader policy issues related to claim drafting and new technologies such as personalized
medicine and Internet-Age inventions. Further, although the test described in each opinion operates differently, it is clear that as a whole, the
Federal Circuit recognizes that there must be an avenue of enforcement
of or multi-participant claims.
2. Protect the Innocent and Conform with Foreign Law
Akamai also argued that an innocent infringer would not be liable for
infringement under any one of a "direction-or-control" theory, an "acting-in-concert" theory, or a "knowingly-combine-to-perform-the-steps"
theory. Akamai explained that under traditional common law, a party
that acted innocently or unknowingly may not necessarily be liable. 173
Accordingly, Akamai concluded that there is no risk that an innocent actor would be liable for patent infringement under any of its proposed
tests.174 Finally, Akamai quickly dismissed the notion that innocent actors
would be ensnared by their proposed joint infringement standard by reiterating that an innocent actor would not be liable for infringement unless
they performed claimed steps with the knowledge that other steps were
being performed.175 By using inducement, the majority opinion in
Akamai II imposed a similar knowledge requirement.1 76
Akamai's brief also acknowledged that consumer liability is a risk in
patent law.' 7 7 But, there is generally not a reason for patentees to sue
consumers. 7 8 In cases where consumers are sued, Akamai argued that
courts would likely protect consumers committing de minimus acts of infringement by imposing little to no damages.179 Finally, Akamai concluded that consumer defendants, characterized as permissive parties, do
not have to be named in a lawsuit.180
With respect to foreign law, Akamai argued that current U.S. law was
inconsistent with foreign law.181 In support of this assertion, the brief
mentioned two theories used in the U.K. and Japan that apply to joint
infringement.18 2 In Japan, where the purchaser carries out the final step
confer patentability. Otherwise, the claims would likely be inherently anticipated. There is no basis for essentially disallowing patents on such inventions
by making it difficult if not impossible to impose liability for joint infringers
of the claimed method.
Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Akamai, supra note 159 at 22-24 (internal citations
omitted).
173. Principal Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Akamai, supra note 158 at 37.
174. Id. at 38.
175. Id. at 24.
176. Akamai Techs., Inc., v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
177. Principal Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Akamai, supra note 158, at 39.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 39-40.
180. Id. at 40.

181. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Akamai, supra note 159, at 21.
182. Id.
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as a "tool" of the vendor, Japanese courts have held the vendor liable for
infringement.1 83 Similarly, in the U.K., where there is evidence of a "common design" between parties, courts have found joint infringement. 1 84
The "common design" rule is analogous to the "joint enterprise" characterization introduced by Judge Linn in his Akamai II dissent. 18 5
In sum, this sub-Part described policy arguments made in the patent
owners' briefs. McKesson did not include policy arguments in its brief.186
In contrast, Akamai's principal brief and reply brief address several policy issues including claim drafting, foreign law, innocent infringer liability,
and the desirability of a bright-line legal rule.'8 7 The policy arguments
advocate for a flexible joint infringement standard that acknowledges the
innate difficulties of claim drafting and still protects innocent consumers
from liability. The next sub-Part will briefly discuss the policy arguments
made by the defendants.

B.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF NON-PATENTEES AND COMPETITORS

The defendants' brief also address some policy considerations from the
perspective of non-patentees and competitors. For example, Limelight asserted that no legitimate policy concern will justify imposing liability for
direct infringement when no party performs each step of the claimed
method.' 88 Both briefs touched on the public notice function, claim drafting, and the incentive to design around. In sum, the policy arguments
made by the defendants argue for no change in the law and place the
burden for crafting enforceable claims squarely on the patentee's
shoulders.
1. Preserving The Public Notice Function
Both Epic and Limelight relied on the idea that patent claims serve a
public notice function to argue for a strict reading and interpretation of
the claims at issue. Epic's reply brief stated,
The public notice function of the patent system is designed to promote innovation and improvements in science and technology by
granting a limited monopoly to a patent holder in exchange for the
public disclosure of the invention that enables "one skilled in the art
to practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has expired" and "to provide notice of the boundaries of the right to
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
186. See Opening En Banc Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant McKesson, supra note 156.
187. See Principal Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Akamai, supra note 158; Reply Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellant Akamai, supra note 159.
188. Brief of Defendant-Cross-Appellant Limelight Networks, Inc. on Rehearing En
Banc at 52, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011 WL 3796785.
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exclude."' 8 9
Limelight emphasized that patent claims define the invention and put the
inventor and public on notice of what they own.190 Limelight further argued that the patentee should bear the cost of enforcement failure if a
party achieves a desired result without infringing the patentee's claims.191
Accordingly, Epic argued that McKesson should be held to the scope of
its multi-party claims and not be allowed to trivialize any claim steps as
less important than the other claimed steps.192
2.

Claims Must Be Carefully Drafted

Further, Epic argued that the public notice function should prevent
courts from rewriting claims such as the ones asserted by McKesson.193
Epic pointed out that McKesson could have written its claims so that they
were directed to a single actor or pursued system claims that would have
avoided a joint infringement analysis.194 Limelight further asserted that
meaningful protection for multi-party claims can be obtained if the claims
are carefully drafted and directed toward a single entity.195 In this instance, Limelight concluded that Akamai simply did not draft its claim to
cover Limelight's activities.196
Akamai insists that it could have drafted its patent to cover a method
that did not require affirmative performance of the tagging step by
any party; in the '703 patent, however, it did not.

. .

. That is, while

Akamai's claim 34, as drafted, is infringed only if the defendant
"tag[s] at least some of the embedded objects," Akamai could instead have applied for a patent claiming "supplying a tag for tagging
at least some of the embedded objects."1 97
Accordingly, Limelight argued that Akamai should not be allowed to
claim a broader claim scope than it asked the PTO to examine and allow.
189. Defendant-Appellee's Response to Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening En Banc Brief
at 40, McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010-1291 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 8, 2011), 2011
WL 3796780 (citing Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2011)).
190. Brief of Defendant-Cross-Appellant Limelight, supra note 188, at 52. ("'It is a
bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which
the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.' Phillipsv. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Enforcement of patents in
conformity with their claims is 'essential to promote progress, because it enables efficient
investment in innovation. A patent holder should know what he owns, and the public
should know what he does not.' Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722, 730-31 (2002).").
191. Id.
192. Defendant-Appellees Response, Epic, supra note 189, at 39.
193. Id. at 40.
194. Id. at 41.
195. Brief of Defendant-Cross-Appellant Limelight, supra note 188, at 54-55.
196. Id. at 55.
197. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Statutory Construction and the Incentive to Design Around

The defendants' briefs also addressed the language of the statute and
the incentive to design around a patent. In response to Akamai's argument that the test put forth in Akamai would encourage business models
designed to misappropriate technology, Limelight pointed out that one of
the fundamental practices in patent law is the attempt by competitors to
design around the patent. 9 8 Thus, Limelight concluded that Akamai's
complaint lacked merit, and designing around patents was in fact just the
nature of patent law and competition in this country.199 Epic argued in its
reply brief that Congress has not modified § 271(a) to contemplate multiple actors.20 0 This argument mirrors the one the majority made in
Akamai II. There, the majority opined that if Congress had wanted to
change the infringement statute to directly address the joint infringement
issue, it had the opportunity during its work on the America Invents
Act.20 1
This sub-Part described policy arguments made in the defendants'
briefs. The Defendant's briefs focused on the benefits of clear claim drafting to the patent system. Overall, the policy arguments made by the defendants place the burden for crafting enforceable claims on the patentee
without concern for the difficulties that accompany drafting claims for
multi-party inventions. The next Part will discuss the policy arguments
made in some of the key Amicus briefs.
V. THE POLICY PERSPECTIVES OF THE AMICUS BRIEFS
Several companies and organizations filed Amicus briefs in Akamai II.
The amici were in the position to make broader and more substantive
policy arguments than the litigants-and did so. This Part details some of
the major policy concerns addressed by the amici. It is difficult to discern
what the overall impact the amci's policy arguments had on the outcome
of Akamai II. However, a few of the policy concerns addressed by the
amicus briefs were present as thematic notes in the Federal Circuit's
opinion.
A.

TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACT

Many amici from the personalized medicine and computer industry
were motivated to submit briefs. The rationale for submitting briefs was
generally related to the author's industry or specifics related to the services and products they offered. For example, Thomson Reuters stated
that it operates businesses in the information technology, software,
198. Id. at 54.
199. Id.

200. Defendant-Appellee's Response, supra note 189, at 37-38.
201. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
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networking, communications, computer and Internet industries. 202 Thomson Reuters further explained that their services depend on working with
third parties to transfer information.203 A brief authored by Cisco, Dell,
eBay, Google, HP, Intel and others (the Cisco brief) stated that they were
frequently targeted by litigious patentees with poorly drafted claims. 204
Accordingly, one policy function of the amicus briefs was to educate the
Federal Circuit about the specific technology areas affected by their
decision.
B.

THE PATENTEE AS THE LEAST-COST AVOIDER

Within these specific technology areas, amici argued that the patentee
is the least-cost avoider. For example, in a brief authored by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the EFF made a policy argument
about the least-cost avoider in the patent system-that is, which party
(the patentee or other non-patentee) should bear the burden of avoiding
harm. Written in support of the defendant, the EFF brief concluded overwhelmingly that the patentee is the least-cost avoider. 205
The EFF brief listed a few reasons why the patentee is the least-cost
avoider. First, the brief asserted that the patentee bears the burden of
defining the scope of their rights with proper claims. 206 This argument ties
in with one of the central premises of the defendants' argument that most
joint infringement issues can be avoided by proper claim drafting. Second, EFF argued that a patentee bears the burden of monitoring and suing for infringement. 207 Having squarely defined the patentees'
obligations, the brief then addressed the obligations of non-patentees,
i.e., third parties.
Concerning non-patentees, the EFF brief identified two different types
of actors, each with their own burden. 208 Generally, these two actors are
(1) parties affirmatively seeking to use potentially patented technology
and (2) "innocent" third parties. 20 9 The EFF acknowledged that users
bear the burden of seeking a license to use patented technology. 210 However, the EFF stated that allowing parties to be found liable for infringement for performing less than the full combination of claimed steps
202. Brief of Amicus Curiae Thomson Reuters Corp. in Support of Defendant-CrossAppellant Limelight Networks, Inc. and Supporting Affirmance at 1, Akamai Techs., Inc.
v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380,
2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011 WL 4071505.
203. Id.
204. Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Systems, Inc. et al. in Support of Defendant-Cross-Appellant at 1, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417) 2011 WL 4438649.
205. Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Defendant at
3-4, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Nos.
2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011 WL 3796789.
206. Id. at 17.
207. Id. at 16.
208. Id. at 16-18.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 16.
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impermissibly shifts the burden and risk of avoiding infringement from
the patentee to the third party. 211
In sum, the EFF concluded that patentees are the least-cost avoiders
and bear the risk of avoiding harm. 212 Although users bear the burden of
seeking licenses, the patentee's initial responsibility is to define the invention. If the patentee does this effectively, the EFF concluded that the risk
of avoiding infringement will not unfairly fall on third parties. 213 While
both the majority opinion and Judge Linn's dissent seem to agree with
this basic premise, neither is clearly ready to absolve third parties of all
liability. This view possibly reflects the Federal Circuit's concern with the
results of joint infringement litigation in district courts discussed in other
amicus briefs.

C.

DISTURBING TRENDS AT THE

DisTRicT COURT LEVEL

Amici highlighted that it was incredibly difficult to find a party liable
for joint infringement at the district court level. Specifically, a brief, authored by Cascades Ventures, Inc. and VNS Corporation, focused on the
impact that the "control or direction" test, established in BMC Resources,
had on the outcome of other joint infringement cases. The brief pointed
out that the Federal Circuit had not affirmed a district court finding of
liability under the "control or direction" test. 214 Although by no means
determinative, the authors used this fact to suggest that something is
wrong with the "control or direction" test and the Federal Circuit's current direction. This suggests that a "good" test would have yielded at least
one result where liability is found, and that BMC Resource's "control or
direction" calculus is not such a test. Perhaps the majority's partial inducement test is an attempt to create a passable test. Judge Linn's dissent
and his formulation of a joint enterprise determination also seem to respond to this concern. Specifically, Judge Linn noted that the Golden
Hour case would have had a different outcome (a finding of infringement) under his test.

D.

IMPACT ON PATENTS

In addition to the district courts, amici also discussed the impact of
joint infringement concerns on how patents were written. The Federal
Circuit routinely considers the impact of its decisions on other patents.2 15
Accordingly, the amicus briefs also discussed what impact the en banc
panel's ruling would have on other patents. Several of the amicus briefs in
support of the defendants argued that enforcement of multi-actor claims
211. Id. at 17-18.
212. Id. at 3-4.
213. Id. at 17-18.
214. Amicus Curiae Brief of Cascades Ventures, Inc. and VNS Corp. in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants and in Support of Reversal at 6, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 20091417), 2011 WL 2323820.
215. Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Systems, Inc. et al., supra note 204, at 4.
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should be extremely limited. For example, The Cisco brief argued that
expanding joint infringement liability would encourage more multi-actor
claims in order to ensnare more parties in litigation. 216 In contrast, the
amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs argued for more liberal enforcement of multi-actor claims. For example, the Cascades Ventures brief argued that existing method and process patents call for steps that must be
performed by more than one entity.2 17 As a result, the panel decision in
Akamai made it impossible for these existing patents to be infringed. 218
Further, the brief quoted one of Newman's policy arguments from her
dissent in McKesson, and reiterated in Akamai II, for the idea that a patent that cannot be infringed is not a patent under the law since it does not
afford its owner the right to exclude. 219 Thus the overall policy concern
expressed to the Federal Circuit was how to balance the interest of patentees of multi-actor claims with the concerns of commercial actors.
E.

IMPACT ON LITIGATION AND COMMERCE

Excessive patent litigation is a common complaint of commercial actors, and its impact on commerce was also touched upon in the briefs.
Most of the amici supporting the defendants were concerned with the
impact the ruling will have on patent litigation. Their briefs favored
bright-line rules over the flexible tests proposed by the plaintiffs. Thomson warned that the inducement and concerted action test proposed by
the plaintiffs were not bright-line rules. 220 Further, Thomson argued that
flexible standards as proposed by Akamai complicated the analysis for
companies-requiring analysis of what claimed steps were performed and
the relationship between actors that performed the steps. 221 Accordingly,
Thomson argued that Akamai's test would increase the cost, complexity,
and the amount of litigation. 222
In defense of the control or direction test, Thompson argued that
Akamai's proposed rule would complicate negotiations between vendors
or service providers. 223 For example, in a case where a vendor wants to
keep their methods a secret, it is possible that these unknown methods
may expose its partners to infringement liability. 224 Thus, to avoid infringement, a vendor may need to negotiate the disclosure of proprietary
methods and technology. Further, EFF argued that holding "downstream
users" of technology liable for infringement would not spur innovation.225
Both sides seemed to agree with a central premise that the patent sys216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 1382.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 7.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Thomson Reuters Corp., supra note 202, at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 205, at 5-6.
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tem should not impede commerce. 226 However, the amici disagreed as to
which legal rule would best support this goal. For example, the Cascade
Ventures brief argued that the current law allows companies like Teva
Pharmaceutical Industries to use exploitation of the loophole as a lucrative business model. 22 7 All three opinions of the Federal Circuit seem to
be responding to this concern, but in different ways. Judge Newman
wanted to do away with the loophole completely. 228 Judge Linn wanted
to expand "control or direction" to include activities by a joint enterprise,229 and the majority held that there was liability if there was partial
inducement. 230

F.

PUBLIC NOTICE

Another way patent policy attempts to avoid excessive litigation and
spur commerce is through the public notice function. Specifically, the
public notice function of a patent helps third parties and patent owners
avoid uncertainty as to the patentees' rights. 23 1 Certainty as to what ideas
are free to develop promotes commercialization of innovative products. 2 3 2 Thus, the public notice function of patents allows businesses to
conduct activities knowing that their actions or products or both will not
infringe others' patents. 2 33
Thomson argued that if liability is imposed in the aggregate for third
parties acting "in concert," then it is difficult for third parties to judge and
control risk. 2 3 4 Multi-party liability would disincentivize patent owners
from engaging in third party transactions. 235
Further, the Cisco brief asserted that analyzing infringement allegations would become more costly if the standard proposed by Akamai was
adopted. 236 Akamai's proposed test would involve not only analyzing
whether the alleged infringer performed a step but also whether independent third parties performed a step. 2 3 7 Under Akamai's proposed test,
businesses like Thomson would have to evaluate their actions-as well as
those of numerous unaffiliated entities, which would severely undermine
the public notice function.238
Most of the judge's views on the Federal Circuit are consistent with the
public notice function. Judge Linn's proposed test would not require a
226.
227.
228.
2012).
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Systems, Inc. et al., supra note 204, at 2-3.
Amicus Curiae Brief of Cascades Ventures, Inc. et al., supra note 214, at 13.
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1319 (Fed. Cir.
Id. at 1337-38.
Id. at 1308.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 205, at 8.
Id.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Thomson Reuters Corp., supra note 202, at 8.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Systems, Inc. et al, supra note 204, at 10.
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Brief of Amicus Curiae Thomson Reuters Corp., supra note 202, at 9.
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company to monitor the activities of actors it was unfamiliar with. Further, the majority's partial inducement rule would also limit the amount
of third party activity a service provider would have to monitor.

G.

CLAIM DRAFTING

Another issue that is closely related to the public notice function is
whether joint infringement issues can be addressed by proper claim drafting. In its brief, Cascade Ventures argued that proper claim drafting is not
a cure-all. First, an inventor cannot predict which step of a method claim
may be farmed out to another company. 239 Second, Cascade Ventures
argued that most issued patents could not be corrected to meet the tests
proposed for joint infringement liability in BMC Resources, Muniauction,
and Akamai 1.240 Cascade Ventures also argued that prior Federal Circuit
precedent made any claim where the user is required to perform a step
virtually impossible to cover with a method claim. 241 Specifically, a claim
that requires a user to interact with a cell phone or computer could not be
enforced 242 because users are neither contractually obligated agents of
the manufacturer, nor directed or controlled to perform the claimed
step. 2 4 3 Accordingly, several amici concluded that simply encouraging
patentees to write better claims would not be enough to alleviate the controversy over joint infringement liability.
In contrast, the Cisco brief explained that the claim drafting issue is
well known to the patent bar and cited Hal Wegner's lecture on claim
drafting as an example of this awareness. 244 Specifically, the Cisco brief
argued that patentees have been on notice since the Aro Manufacturing
and Deepsouth cases that claims must be directed to cover the activity of
one entity. 24 5 The simplest solution to the problem is careful claim drafting that will avoid joint infringement issues and put parties on notice of
potential infringement. 246 Accordingly, Cisco's brief asserted that
"[c]laim drafting can solve virtually all of the issues raised by Akamai." 2 47
For example, the Cisco brief said that the tagging step in the asserted
Akamai claim could have been rewritten to say "for a given page normally served from the content provider domain, (receiving at the server
at least some tagged) the embedded objects of the page so that requests
for the objects resolve to the domain instead of the content provider
domain." 248
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
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Overall, Amici in support of the defendants argued that it was the patentee's responsibility to draft clear claims that could be infringed by a
single entity. Further, bad claims should not be enforced. These Amici
asserted that not enforcing patents with bad claims will force patentees to
write better claims. 249 For example, EFF referred to the Chef America,
Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc. case to argue that there is nothing bad about
patents not being enforceable against defendants. There, the court re,
fused to correct a drafting error that resulted in a finding of non-infringement. 250 Accordingly, amici in support of the defendants asserted that the
patentee solely responsible for determining the scope of its rights by
drafting claims that set out the scope of infringing activity. 251
The Federal Circuit's policy that it will not redraft claims for policy
reasons is longstanding. Despite this fact, it is clear that most judges on
the Federal Circuit are somewhat sympathetic to the complex claim drafting issues that are raised by joint infringement liability. Judge Newman
argued that the number of infringers of a claim should not matter. Judge
Linn argued to expand infringement liability to capture infringers engaged in a joint enterprise. Finally, the majority's introduction of a partial
inducement rule was likely due to an attempt to preserve the public notice function of claim language while imposing a flexible test that is more
workable for personalized medicine and Internet-Age patentees.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Policy concerns can play an enhanced role in patent infringement cases
where the law is unclear or new technology is at issue. Technology such as
personalized medicine and Internet-age technologies may trigger joint infringement issues. Joint infringement is a doctrine that attempts to explain how to allocate liability where more than one entity performs the
steps of a method claim such that the entities' performance in the aggregate infringes the claimed method. The Federal Circuit has continued to
modify the doctrine in several cases since 2007.252 Akamai II is the culmination of four major joint infringement cases heard at the Federal Circuit.2 53 As a result, a number of amici filed briefs in the case-many of
which highlighted the unique policy issues at stake.
This article concludes that the opinions issued in Akamai II suggest
that most of the judges on the en banc panel were sympathetic to the
policy concerns raised by the plaintiffs and their amici. However, the frac249. Id. at 16.
250. Id. at 14.
251. Id. at 7.
252. See W. Keith Robinson, Ramifications of Joint Infringement Theory on Emerging
Technology Patents, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 335 (2010); W. Keith Robinson, No "Direction" Home: An Alternative Approach to Joint Infringement, 62 AM. U. L. REv. 59
(2012).
253. See generally McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) 1281
(Fed. Civ. 2011); Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010 (per curiam); Muniauction Inc. v.
Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008); BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498
F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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tured decision illustrates the judges' inability to come to a consensus on
what it means for a multi-party claim to be directly infringed. Specifically,
the Federal Circuit was torn between a formalistic approach and a measured approach that expresses some policy preference for either a change
in the law or a change in how the law is interpreted. Thus, while there is
no way to ascertain whether any policy argument had a direct effect on
the outcome of the case, the result in Akamai II is a clear example of the
uncertainty caused when a loophole in the patent statute forces the court
into the role of policy maker.

